企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用外文翻

企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用外文翻

外文文献翻译

2011届

译文一:企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用（上）

译文二:企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用（下）

学生姓名周伟

专业会计	学 号07062136	院 系 经济与管理学院
	指导教师 许庆高	完成日期2010年12月2

CorporateTax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based

IncentivesI

JohnD. Phillips University of Connecticut

ABSTRACT

Thisstudy investigates whether compensating chief executive

officersand business-unit managers using after-tax accounting-basedperformance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, theempirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizingproprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporateexecutives, the relation between effective tax rates and after-taxperformance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-stepapproach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated withfirms' decisions to compensate managers on a pre- versus after-taxbasis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis thatcompensating bustness~unit managers, but not chief executiveofficers, on an after-tax basis leads to lower effective tax rates.

KEYWORDStaxplanning;performance measures;endogenous treatment effects.

T.INTRODUCTION

Effectivetax planning, defined by Scholes et al. 2002 as tax planning

thatimizes the firm's expected discounted after-tax cash flows, requires

managersto consider their decisions，after-taxconsequences. In this paper, I

investigstewhether after-tax accounting-based performance measures 1 ead to

lowereffective tax rates ETR, my empirical surrogate for tax planning

effectiveness.1 The ETR, an income-statement-based outcome measure calculated

asthe ratio of total income tax expense to pre-tax income, generallymeasures

theeffectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higherafter-tax

income.A lower ETR，however,can only proxy for tax savings and does not always

implythat after-tax income and/or cash flows have been imized. 2 Despi tethis

limitation，theETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on

thetax function Mills et al. 1998 and corporate tax departmentperformance

Douglaset al. 1996. Also, lowering the ETR is frequently cited as a way to

increaseearnings e. g., Ziegler 1997 and increase share price e. g., Mintz

1999;Swenson 1999.

Accountingresearch has addressed the relation between accounting-

basedcompensation and managers^ actions e. g., Larcker 1983; Healy 1985;

Wallace1997. This paper is the first to address whether after-taxaccounting-

basedperformance measures motivate managers to take actions that helplower

theirfirms' ETR and does so at both th巳chiefexecutive officer CEO and

business-unitSBU manager 1evels< Prior after-tax performance measure research

hasfocused only on the determinants of compensation CEOs using pre-versus

sfter-taxearnings e.g., Newman 1989; Carnes and Guffey 2000; Atwood et al.

1998;Dhaliwal et al. 2000 and provides no evidence concerning after-tax

compensation，seffectiveness in 1owering a firm's tax liability. Extending this

investigationto the SBU level is motivated out of the apparent conflict between

argumentsthat taxes should be allocated to SBU for incentive compensation

purposese. g., McLemore 1997 with empirical observations that a majority of

firmsdo not do so e. g. , Douglas et al. 1996.4 The current investigatioii

providesevidence concerning the incrementai effectiveness of explicitly

motivatingCEOs and SBU managers to incorporate tax consequences into their

operatingand investment decisions.

Acommon issue in cross-sectional studies that attempt to link a

particularmanagement accounting choice to an outcome measure is that all sample

firmsmay be optimizing with respect to the choice being investigatedTttner and

Larcker2001. Without addressing the endogeneity of a firm" s choice, itis

difficultto provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to animproved

outcome.To address this issue, the relation between ETR and CEO andSBU-manager

after-taxperformance measures is estimated using a two-step approach thathelps

correctfor the potential endogenei ty bias associated wi th these two choice

variables.As a first step in implementing this approach, the Antle and Demski

1988controllability principle is used to model a firm" s decisionsto adopt

after-taxCEO and SBU-manager performance measures. To include a particular

measurein a manager" s compensati（）ncontract, this principle requires that

theexpected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measuremust be

greaterthan the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the managerfor

theresulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after- taxperformance

measureshould be used as a contracting variable in a manager，sincentive

compensationcontract only if the manager^ s involvement in tax-planning efforts

leadsto a difference between pre-tax and after-tax accounting results,which is

generallyreflected in the ETR. Consistent with prior research, the pre- versus

after-taxCEO and SBU-manager selection models include variables that control

fora firm，stax~planniiig opportunities because the presence of such

opportunitiesreflect the extent to which a manager"s actions can be expectedto

lowerthe ETR.

Evenif a manager^ s efforts are expected to lead to a lower ETR, a

firmwill use an after~tax performance measure only if the expectedbenefits

exceedthe expected costs of doing so. An after~tax performance measure is

expectedto lead to a lower ETR because it motivates the manager^ s increased

cooperationwith tax professionals to help identify, develop, and execute tax-

planningstrategies. McLemore 1997, 1 cites Hewlett Packard" s taxdirector to

supportthe need for SBU-manager involvement in tax-planning efforts:

Taxplanning is only as good as being involved in the early stages of

suchthings as business planning, strategic planning, and merger andacquisition

work.Your tax department has to be represented at the table when those

decisionsare made. The evolving model for the future is the tight integration

oftax people with business unit planning.

Costsassociated with using after-tax performance measures

includethe additional wage that must be paid to compensste the manager forthe

increasedrisk due to potential tax law changes and the increased effort that

resultsfrom including income tax expense in the compensation contract. Other

potential

costs

associated

with

after-tax

compensation

include

the

administrativecost of allocating tax expense to a firm5s SBU, increased tax

examinationcosts, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring

after-taxcompensation^ s benefits via observed ETR, there are no clear

empiricalsurrogates for after-tax performance measures' costs. This study thus

focuseson the realized benefits of compensating managers on an after-taxbasis

butdoes not provide evidence of the associated costs' magnitude.

Proprietarydata obtainecl in a survey of corporate executives are

usedto construct certain test vsrisbles, including those indicatingwhether

CEOsand SBU managers are compensated using after-tax accounting-based

performancemeasures.卩ubliclyavailable data are used to construct ETR and

othertest variables. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that

compensatingSBU managers, but not CEOs, on an after-tax basis leads to lower

ETR,resulting in an estimated median tax savings of $13.3 millionannually.

Sensitivitytests performed on a subsample of firms with high simulated MTR

Graham1996 provide further evidence that low-MTR firms' potentialETR-lowering

actionsthat could have ambiguous effects on cash flows and after-tax profits

arenot driving this result. Further sensitivity tests help rule out the

proportionof tax function outsourcing as an alternative explanation for the

statisticallyand economically significant negative relation between after- tax

SBU-managercompensation and ETR.

The

results

contribute

to

the

accounting-based

compensation

literatureby linking after- tax accounting-based performance measures to SBU-

managerinvolvement that is incrementally effective in lowering firms' ETR.

Consistentwith Guidry e tai. 1999 who docume nt bonus-induced earnings

managementat the SBU level, this finding provides additional insight into the

effect

that

SBU-manager

accounting-based

incentives

have

on

managers'

acti（）ns.Also, the estimated explicit tax savings resulting from after-tax

performancemeasures provide corporate decision makers with information relevant

tothe design of SBU-manager incentive compensation plans.

Thepaper proceeds as follows. The next section sets forth the

hypothesestested in this study. Section III outlines the empirical models and

estimationprocedures used in testing these hypotheses. Section IV provides a

discussionof the data and sample, including a brief overview of the survey used

toobtain proprietary compensation data. Results are presented inSection V. The

finalsection provides the conclusion and a discussion of the study's

limitations.

II.HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Newman1989, Cares and Guffey 2000, and Atwood et al. 1998

investigatefirms' choices of after-tax earnings as the contracting

variablein CEO bonus plans. These studies hypothesize that firms

withgreater tax-planning opportunities, consistent with the Antle

andDemski

1988controllability principle, are more likely to use after-taxperformance

measures.Using proxies for tax~planning opportunities,

thesestudies collectively find that multinational status， numberof

operatingsegments, firm size, and capital intensity are associated

withafter-tax CEO compensation. Atwood et al. positively

presentsevidence that leverage is negatively associated choice. 1998also

企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用（上） withthis

约翰D?菲利普斯康涅狄格大学

摘要

本研究探讨首席执行官是否修止主管和业务部门经理利用税后会计为基

础的绩效措施，导致较低的实际税率，以报酬激励用于税收筹划的有效性。企业的

主管由于被激励获得的专有报酬的数据，运用建模和估计这两个步骤来研究有效

税率和税后性能指标之间的关系来更正企业的管理人员的决定，以修正相关的内

生性偏置前与后的计税基础。结果与假设一致修正了业务部门经理，但是没有修

正主管，关于税后导致较低的实际税率。

关键词税收计划；性能指标；内源性的处理效果

引言

有效的税收筹划，根据斯科尔斯等人的定义（2002）,税收筹划，即最大限

度地提高公司的预期税后净现金流量,要求管理者要考虑他们的决定所造成的税

后结果。在本文中，研究是否以税后会计为基础的绩效措施，将导致较低的实际岀

口退税税率。实际的经验替代了出口退税的税务规划效力,一个基础的收入结果

被合适的计量，所得税费用总额作为税前收入的一定比例，通常测量减税策略将

导致更高的税后收入的有效性。较低的出口退税，然而，仅能够代理节税以及通常

并不意味税后收入或者是现金流已经达到最大值。尽管有这一局限性，出口退税

还是被用来衡量税收功能性支出的有效性（米尔斯,1998）和企业各部门税务绩效

（道格拉斯,1996）。另外，降低出口退税是经常被作为一种增加收入（齐格勒,1997

）和使股价上升的手段e.g. Mintz 1999; Swenson 1999。

会计研究处理了以会计绩效为基础的薪酬和经理的行为之间的关系e.g.,

Larcker1983; Healy 1985; Wallace 1997,本文是第一个从事这方面研

究的文章:是否以税后会计为基础的绩效管理措施鼓励经理人员采取行动来降低

他们公司的出口退税，并且首席执行官和事业部经理也要求做。在此之前的税后

业绩计量研究只集中于首席执行官们的报酬的决定因素为预先的税后收益e.g.,

Newman1989; Carnes and Guffey 2000; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al.

2000,没有提供任何证据说明降低一个公司的税务负担与税后报酬的关系。这项

调查扩展到了事业部层次，这些部门的报酬激励动机与减少税收的目的目的之间

存在明显的冲突e.g.,McLemore 1997以及观察的经验是,大多数企业没有这样做e.

g.,Douglas et al. 1996o冃前的研究提供的证据关于明确激励首席执行

官和事业部管理人员纳入其经营和投资决策的税务结果的增量效益。

以某个侧而来研究出口退税与管理层薪酬的共同课题，衡量的结果是所

有样木公司可优化关于被调查的选择Ittnerand Larcker 20010如果不解决公

司选择的内生性，很难提供一致的证据关于这选择导致改善的结果。为了解决这

个问题，首席执行官和事业部经理关于税后绩效与出口退税的联系依旧采用两步

方式估计，可以帮助对潜在的内牛性与相关偏见这两个变量做出正确的选择。作

为实施这一方法的第一步，theAntle and Demski 1988可控性原则是用来模拟

一个公司的决定,通过对首席执行官和事业部经理税后绩效指标的衡量。要包括

一个特别措施在经理人的薪酬合同中，这一原则要求持有一-个衡量预期收益和负

责任的经理更加努力工作来规避所支付的附加工资之间的额外风险。因此，税后

绩效指标应作为一个激励经理人的获取额外报酬的方法，只有当经理的税务规划

工作的参与导致了税前和税后核算结果之间的差异，这通常反映在出口退税上

面。与以前的研究相一致,包括与首席执行官和事业部经理选择税后模型的变量,

对于一个企业的税务筹划的机会控制，因为这种机会的存在会在某种程度上反映

了经理人的行动，可以预期,将会降低出口退税。

即使通过经理人的努力，预计将导致较低的出口退税，公司将使用税后绩

效指标只有当预期收益超过预期成本才这样做，税后业绩措施预计会导致较低的

出口退税，因为它促使管理人员和税务专业人员加强合作以达成一致的，发展的,

执行税收筹划策略,McLemore1997, 1引用惠普公司的税务主任支持税务规划工

作需要事业部经理参与的必要性：

税收筹划这种事情也只有在被作为业务规划的早期阶段，战略上的规划,

兼并和收购工作……你的税务部门要在会议上，代表这些部门做出决定。对未来

的发展模式是税务策划人与业务部门紧密合作完成的。

与使用税后业绩的措施有关的费用包括附加工资必须支付给经理以弥补

由于潜在的税法变化增加的风险，使经理加倍的努力，包括，从合同中补偿个人所

得税方面费用的增加的结果。与税后报酬有关的其他潜在费用包括向一个公司的

事业部分配行政费用开支，税务检查成本增加，并增加税务机关审查频率。相反,

通过观察出口退税的好处来衡量税后报酬，有没有税后业绩计量的成本效益明显

的有经验代理人。因此，本研究着重于在管理者的基础上实现的税后补偿效益,

但不提供相关的成本，规模的证据。

在企业主管的调查中所获得的专有数据用于构造并测试某些变量，说明

是否包括那些首席执行官和事业部的经理们使用税后会计基础的绩效指标。公开

数据用于构造出口退税和其他变量来测试，结果与假设一致，即事业部经理的报

酬,但不包括公司首席执行官的，与税后导致较低的出口退税有关，估计使每年平

均节省1330万美元的税款。模拟公司进行敏感性测试的子样木中，边际税率Graham

1996提供进一步的证据表明，低边际税率的公司将会有降低潜在出口退

税的行动，可能对现金流量和税后利润不吻合这一结果产生模棱两可的影响。敏

感性测试有助于进一步排除了税收职能外包的比例，作为另一种解释，统计上和

经济上显示事业部经理的税后报酬和出口退税呈负相关。

研究结果有助于薪酬以会计为基础的著作，通过实施事业部经理参与的

以税后会计为基础的绩效措施，是逐步降低企业出口退税的有效措施。符合Guidry

etal. 1999表明了奖金导致事业部盈余管理水平的不同，这一发现提供

了更多的有洞察力的影响，事业部经理以会计绩效为基础对管理人员的行为进行

激励。另外，明确的表明企业的决策者设计降低所得税费用的公司税后业绩会使

管理层人员获得更多薪酬的措施来激励事业部经理。

该文章的过程如下：下一节阐述了在这项研究中测试的假设。第三节概述

了经验模型和估计程序在测试中使用的一些假说。第四节提供了数据和样本的讨

论,包括用于获得所有的用于调查的报酬数据的简要概述。结果列于第五章最后

一节提供了一个结论，即关于该研究的局限性的讨论。

II.假说发展

Newman1989, Cares and Guffey 2000, and Atwood et al. 1998 调查

作为税后盈利企业对首席执行官奖金计划包含变量的选择。这些研究假设，企业

有更大的税收筹划的机会，与Antleand Demski 1988的可控性原则一致,更有可

能使用税后业绩的措施。利用税收筹划的机会代理,这些研究都发现了跨国公司

的地位，经营分部的数量，企业规模，首席执行官的报酬和资本密集度呈正相

关,Atwoodet al. 1998还提出证据，充分利用这一负相关的选择。

CorporateTax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based

IncentivesII

JohnD. Phillips University of Connecticut

Dhaliwalet al. 2000 also focuses on the relation between a firm's

tax~planning opportunities and the deci si on whether to use after-tax earnings

inCEO bonus plans, but measures planning opportunities using onlyrealized tax

creditsand absolute values of firms* permanent book一taxdifferences・They

excludetemporary book-tax differences such as those resulting fromaccelerated

taxdepreciation because these differences do not impact a firm" safter-tax

accountingearnings, the performance measure used in after-tax accounting-based

bonusplans. Similarly, the ETR used in the current study is computed using

totaltax expense in the numerator, thereby excluding the effects oftemporary

book-taxdifferences.

Consistentwith prior lit era tu re, Dhaliwal et al. 2000 find that

firmswith greater tax credits and sb solute values of permanent book-tax

differencesare more 1 ikely to compensate their CEOs on an after-tax basis.

Becausepermanent differences can either increase or decrease taxable income

relativeto book income, they provide no direct evidence of an association bet

weenafter - tax CEO compensation and lower ETR. The current studyinvestigates

thisrelation between after-tax CEO compensstion and ETR. The firsthypothesis,

statedin al ternative form i s:

Hl:Using after-tax performance measures in CEO accounting-based

bonusplans leads to lower ETR.

Thispaper also extends the pre- versus after-tax compensation

analysisto SBU-manager incentive compensation plans. The need for SBU-manager

invoIvementin tax-planning efforts is consistent with the coordination task

thatarises when specialists require input and cooperation from nonspecialists

Milgromand Roberts 1992. The firm，stax professionals not on1y need help from

thefirm，sSBU managers in the identification of tax-planning opportunities, but

alsotheir cooperation in developing and executing strategies tocapitalize on

suchopportunities.

Tnthe context of lowering the ETR and increasing after一tax

accountingincome, how do SBU managers participate in efforts that increase tax

creditsand lead to permanent differences that lower taxable income? Colgate-

Palmolive'sCFO states that ''Colgate man- agers routinely watch for ways to

timeremittances from overseas [which leads to higher foreign taxcredits],

imizeresearch and development tax credits> " Mintz 1999, 2. SBUmanagers can

alsohelp tax professionals formulate transfer prices Ernst & Young1999, which

helpslower the ETR by decreasing increasing income reported in countrieswith

taxrates in excess of lower than the U. S. tax rate. 5 Other examples ofSBU-

managerinvolvement that helps 1ower the ETR include 1 determining whether a

potentialemployee qualifies for a payroll-based tax credit before the hiring

decisionis made, 2 consulting with the firm" s tax professionals priorto

domesticlocation decisions to incorporate varying state and local tax ratesas

afactor in such decisions, and 3 helping tax professionals gather data

necessaryto document tax return reporting positions.

Thedbove discussion suggests that SBU-manager involvement is helpful

inlowering the ETR. It is possible that the pre- versus after-taxnature of the

CEO'saccounting-based bonus plan signals tax planning^ s importance andthus

providesimplicit incentives sufficient to motivate SBU managers to assist in

effortsthat lower the firm" s ETR. If this were so, then explicitincentive pay

wouldnot be necessary to motivate such efforts・Wi1son 1995, 12, however,

citesan interview with a corporate executive to support his conclusionthat

after-taxmeasures motivate SBU managers to become involved in tax-planning

efforts:

Weinstituted after-tax divisional measures that we have continued to

refine.This puts the business units in the position that they think abouttaxes

asthey make decisions.

Similarly,Mintz 1999, 2 cites the Colgate-Palmolive CFO's argument

forafter-tax performance measures:

Werepre-tax income to govern incentives, then employees with bonuses

ontheir minds would pay far less sttention to favorable taximplications. But

becauseincentive compensation reflects after-tax earningsmanagers arerewarded

whentaxes are lowered.

Theabove arguments are consistent with evidence that mid-level

managersrespond to explicit bonus-based incentives e. g., Kahn and Sherer1990;

Guidryet al. 1999. Compensating a firm" s SBU managers on an after-taxbasis is

thusexpected to promote efforts that 1 ead to a 1 ower ETR. The second

hypothesis,stated in alternative form, is as follows:

H2:Using after-tax SBU~manager accounting-based performance measures

leadsto lower ETR.

III.EMPIRICAL MODELS

Totest the hypotheses stated in the previous section, the

followingequations are estimated cross sectionally:

VariableDefinitions

EndogenousVariables

Theeffective tax rate ETR is defined as the ratio of total tax

expenseTTE to pre- tax income.